Detail Cantuman

ABSTRACT. The aim of this article is to analyse the
internal mechanisms of corporate governance (board of
directors and ownership structure), which influence voluntary
disclosure of intangibles. The results appear to
corroborate the view that an increase in institutional
investor shareholding has a negative effect on voluntary
disclosure, supporting the hypothesis of entrenchment,
whereas an excessive ownership by institutional investors
may have adverse effects on strategic disclosure decisions.
The results also indicate that an increase in the number of
members of the board to up to 15 has a beneficial effect on
the disclosure of intangibles. However, as this number
increases, the effect inverts and becomes adverse to
improving the capacity for supervision and control in the
decision-making process regarding the voluntary disclosure
of intangibles. The findings endorse the recommendation
of the most of the Corporate Governance Codes
regarding an advisable maximum of 15 members on a
board to ensure its effectiveness and internal cohesion.
KEY WORDS: corporate governance, intangibles, board
of directors, intellectual capital